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Chapter 2 
Theism and Human Rights 
Paul Cliteur 
In an article on "Culture, Religion, and Gender" the Israeli professor of law 
Frances Raday (b. 1944) takes a clear stance with regard to religion and human 
rights. Human rights as we know it today, she writes, "is a product of the shift from 
a religious to secular state culture at the time of the Enlightenment in eighteenth-
century Europe" (Raday 2003: 663). The eighteenth century was a time when 
the religious paradigm was replaced by secularism, communitarianism and 
individualism; and status by contract. According to Raday the modern concept 
of human rights is the chi ld of secularism. She quotes with approval the historian 
YehoshuaArieli (1916-2002) who wrote: 
The secular character of the normative system embodied in human rights 
doctrine is essential to its comprehension. All its premises, values, concepts and 
purposes relate to the homocentric world and to ways of thought freed from 
transcendentalist premises and from the jurisdjction of religious authority. And 
so, the development of the doctrine of human rights is inseverably connected to 
the process of secularization of Western society .... (Raday 2003: 663) 
The vision ofRaday and Arieli means there is a clash between hu!llan rights culture 
and classical theism as it manifests itself in the great monotheistic traditions of 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. And this conflict will by some be interpreted as 
a specification of a wider conflict, namely that between modern scientific culture 
and ancient religion (Menuge 200 I). 
This view is not universally shared, to say the least. There are many authors 
who point out the continuous relevance of the premodem worldview of theism for 
our contemporary morals and culture. In The Bible Now Richard Elliort Friedman 
and Shawna Dolansky tell us that many, people still study the Bible as a foundation 
of morality and virtue (Friedman and Dolansky 201 1: xi). Reading the books of 
Karen Annstrong (b. 1944) or listening to a recent convert to Catholicism such as 
Tony Blair (b. 1953) one gets the impression that all our modern enlightened values 
are not only derived from religious sources but dependent thereon (Armstrong 
2007, 2009a, 2009b; Blair 20 I 0; Griffitbs 2011 ). 
There seems to be a prima facie contradiction between two groups of scholars: 
those who see a contradiction between modern human rights and theism and 
those who consider human rights to be a product of theism and dependent on it 
(Copan 2011 ). 
In: Angus J .L. Menuge, ed., Legitimi:rjng Hmnan Rights: S tmlar attd 
Religious Pmpt(/iuu, Ashgate, Franham, Burlington 2013, pp. 33-57. 
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But soon things turn out to be more complicated. Reading Elliott Friedman's 
and Dolansky's The Bible Now more closely we stumble upon sentences like " the 
Bible has often been misused" (Friedman and Dolansky 20 ll : x iii) and "people 
used the Bible for hann" (ibid.: xii). 
Apparently, according to the authors of The Bible Now there is a "use" of the 
Bible. And "using" the Bible teaches us "the Bible is an extraordinary repository of 
remarkable stories, exquisite writing, and revolutionary laws" (ibid.: xi). But there 
is also a "misuse" of the Bible. This is the case when the Bible is used for "harm." 
That means t11ere is a tllird positiqn about the relationship between theism and 
human rights. Theism can be "used" as a basis for harmful practices, but theism 
can also be used for good. The authors even tell us when that misuse is in play: 
when the Bible is used for "hann." 
This puts us on the track of further questions like the following: is "hann" the 
only criterion we have at our disposal to speak of "misuse" of the Bible or are 
iliere any other criteria? Answers to this question might prove helpful because 
tllere are many discussions nowadays where freedom of religion as interpreted 
by orthodox religious people and human rights doctrine seem to clash. Theism 
seems at loggerheads with human rights in questions concerning tlle sanctification 
of violence (jihad, crusades; Kelsay 2009), male and female circumcision (Tamir 
l 996; Putzke et al. 2008), unstunned ritual slaughter of animals (Lemer and 
Rabello 2006/2007), homosexuality (Wolfenden Report 1963), the death penalty 
(Beckwith 2002) and many other subjects. 
It is the aim of this chapter to explore this field. [ want to develop criteria for 
the legitimate "use" ofreUgion within the context of human rights. To illustrate my 
argument it is helpful to treat one of the vexing issues around the legal definition 
of religion. Here there is more than one option, but I choose the issue ofunstunned 
ritual s laughter, more particularly ilie question whether the exemption of the 
general obligation to stun animals before slaughter can be justified on the ground 
of freedom of religion. 
In the pages that follow 1 will first give an idea of the structure of human 
rights law with regard to the freedom of religion. Subsequently I will show why 
unstunned ritual slaughter became an issue in ilie Netherlands. Finally 1 will try to 
argue that unstunned ritual slaughter does not necessarily have to be considered a 
"religious" issue. At the end of this chapter I will present some guidelines for the 
legal acknowledgement of reUgion. 
Human Rights in Treaty Law 
To understand the aim of this exercise it is necessary to say something about the 
way human rights are prot~cted in human rights treaties. Reading these human 
rights treaties will make clear that the question "what is religion?" is far from 
academic. This is not ilie case because "religion" and "religious practices" enjoy 
a special legal protection in the constitutions of most European states and also in 
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international human rights treaties where freedom of religion is accepted as a basic 
or fundamental right. 
The European Convention on Human Rights includes Article 9. This Article 
has two paragraphs and both are important with regard to the protection of freedom 
of religion. The first paragraph goes as follows: 
I. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, and to manifest his religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
The crucial word is "religion." Like "thought" and "conscience," religion enjoys 
a special protection. Whether "religion" deserves that protection on an equal par 
with "thought" and "conscience" is not something I will address in this chapter. 
1 will take as my point of departure that there is "freedom of religion" as a 
constitutional and human right. Those who argue that there should be no separate 
provision for freedom of religion but only for freedom of speech or freedom of 
conscience will consider my argument beside the point. But 1 will take for granted 
that for historical and intrinsic reasons there is special protection for religion. 
Subsequently, 1 will try to develop criteria of how to deal with tl1at freedom of 
religion. If an idea or a practice is not recognized as "religious" in nature there 
is 110 chance of having this idea or practice protected as religious freedom under 
a human rights regime. But if it is, the person invoking that freedom can claim a 
special protection of his beliefs and manifestation of that belief. 
But once this hurdle is taken, there is another in the second paragraph of Art. 9. 
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
U1e interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
On Limiting the Freedom of Religion 
As follows from the foregoing paragraphs: human rights are not absolute. Most 
of them are limited, and those limitations have been laid down in human rights 
treaties. Let us focus on the limitations on the freedom of religion as laid down in 
paragraph 2 of Article 9 oftl1e European Convention on Human Rights. How are 
we to read those clauses? · 
In my interpretation the clearest and least misleading way to read these 
limitations is to say that iliey express additional necessmy conditions to have 
freedom of religion effectively protected. What the whole Alticle on the freedom 
of religion teaches us (in both the European Convention and also the International 
Convention) is that once an idea or practice is recognized as "religious," this is 
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only a necess01y (and not a su.fficienJ) condition for an effective protection of this 
idea or practice under a human rights regime. To have that effective protection of 
a human r:ight fully realized, another condition has to be fulfilled, namely that the 
expression or manifestation of this religious idea or religious practice does not 
violate (i) the law;1 (ii) does not contravene democratic standards, and (iii) does 
not violate certain standards of public order, health or morals or the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Unstunned Ritual Slaughter 
Now I will be somewhat more specific about the matter of slaughtering animals. 
In this chapter 1 want to reflect on tbe concept of"religion", as used in Atticle 9 
of the European Convention. But I want to do this in relation to a much discussed 
religious practice lately, namely unstunned ritual slaughter of animals. The 
question is this. People use meat for consumption. There is much to say about this 
habit, but this is not tbe topic of my chapter (Regan 1980; Waiters and Portmess 
1999). People eat meat and we will take that for granted. But at the same time 
people want to assure that animals that are about to be slaughtered experience only 
a minimum of stress and pain during the process (at least, that is often presented 
as the rationale behind the legislation on humane slaughter). For that reason, many 
countries adopted legislation that prescribes "stunning" before the animal is kiUed. 
Only "stunned" ritual slaughter was considered to be "humane" (Welty 2007; 
Miller 1959; Mariucci 2008). 
This legislation is challenged by religious groups (Jewish and Muslim) claiming 
that stunning violates their freedom of religion. Unstunned ritual slaughter is for 
example prescribed for the kosher schechita. There are a lso some Muslim groups 
who claim that balal meat requires unstunned ritua l slaughter. So the question is: 
can those exemptions from general legislation about the slaughtering of animals 
be acknowledged as the expression of a religion? 
Although most countries accept exemptions from the general prescription 
of stunning before slaughter, these exemptions are challenged by animal rights 
activists and veterinarians who point out that unstunned ritual slaughter is not 
a very animal-friendly practice. ln May 2012 the British veterinarian Professor 
Bill Reilly, a former president of the British Veterinary Association, caused 
some controversy with an article in Veterinary Record, a publication of that 
same organization. ReiUy criticized the-in his opinion- "unacceptable" rise in 
the number of animals killed in ritual slaughter. Reilly said: "ln my view, the 
current situation is not acceptable and, if we cannot eliminate non-stunning, we 
need to keep it to a mirumum" (BBC News 2012b). He proposed two things: (i) 
restricting the use of ha1a1 and kosher meat to those communities that require it 
Which can be problematic, because we have countries where, for example, apostasy 
is illegal though it seems integral to freedom of religion. 
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for their religious beliefs and (ii) convincing those religious communities of the 
acceptability of stunned altematives. 
Reilly provoked many negative reactions from the religious communities 
he was accused of having attacked. Simon Cohen of Shechita OK contested the 
scholarly information that Rei lly tried to convey. His research was "deeply flawed," 
according to Cohen. Dr. A Majid Katme from the Islamic Medical Association 
joined Cohen in criticizing the assumption that science had proven that unstunned 
ritual slaughter was more painful for animals than stunned slaughter. She made 
an addition, however, discrediting the implicit religious criticism that she thought 
was inherent in Reilly's stance. She said: "It is arrogant for someone who is not a 
Muslim to presume that he can teach us the practice of our faith" (ibid.). But Reilly 
got support from organizations concemed with a11imal welfare. Joyce D 'Silva, 
from the charity organization Compassion in World Fanning, said: "Judaism 
and IsJam believe that animals are creatures of God; science tells us that they are 
sentient beings, who can suffer" (ibid.). 
These are all indications that the issue ofritual slaughter is highly controversial 
and this discussion is not likely to abate in the coming petiod. In the Netherlands 
there was a discussion on the same topic when in 2011 a legislative proposal 
was launched by The Party for the Animals (Tweede Kamer, Lower House of 
Parliament, 2009- 10, 31 571, nr. 2). On JIUne 28, 2011 jn the lower house of the 
Dutch Parliament an ovetwhelming majority of 116 against 30 votes opted in favor 
of a bill making it obligatory to stun animals before slaughter. The exemption from 
the general obligation for religious groups would be eliminated from Dutch law. 
I will come back to the Dutch discussion on this topic later in this chapter. 
Let me strut with the general rule on stunning according to Dutch law: Animals 
to be slaughtered are required to be stunned before slaughter. But in the Dutch 
Health and Welfare Law ("Gezondheids- en Welzijnswet"), there was an Article 
44, paragraph 3, making an exemption for religious ritual slaughter: "Slaughtering 
animals without pre-stunning according to the Israeli tic or Islamic rites is al !owed." 
The proposal for legislation by the Party of the Animals would change this. They 
proposed to change the Article in the legal code cited in the following manner: 
"Slaughtering animals accord ing to the Israeli tic or the Islamic rites is only allowed 
when the animal is stunned." This topic gained international attention. BBC News 
Europe reported: "Dutch MPs effectively ban ritual slaughter of animals" (BBC 
News 2011 ). But only a few months later, on December 14, 2011 the Dutch Senate 
decided to freeze its vote against the ban on unstunned ritual slaughter (Eerste 
Kamer, Bedwelming bij ritueel slacbten, 31571 , December 13, 2011 ). 
The Importance of this Debate 
Why is this debate on unstunned ritual slaughter impOJ1ant at all? One thing is 
cettain: it is not because unstunned ritual slaughter is the most impmtant issue 
regarding animal welfare. There are countless other issues that deserve more 
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attention from the perspective of animal rights or animal welfare (Van den Berg 
20 12). If we would consider legislative measures concerning animal welfare, 
a legislative bill making it a criminal act to consume meat would be far more 
effective. But that is not the point of this chapter. This is about animal welfare 
as such. What my intention is, is to analyze one specific issue where freedom of 
religion (or religion) gets into conflict with the modem secular morality of human 
rights, more in patticu lar with the utilitarian aim to increase the happiness in this 
world. The topic of unstunned ritual slaughter is one of the many issues J could 
have selected to make my point. My point is this: in a modern liberal democracy 
we can accept freedom of.religion only up to a certain degree. Freedom of religion 
can be accepted insofar as it is in harmony with generally accepted human rights 
and moral standards. What r will try to do is to develop criteria that judges and 
legislatures can use in order to decide where freedom of religion is legitimate 
and where it is not. For this purpose the discussion on unstunned ritual slaughter 
proved a fruitful case. 
For lhe moment, the discussion in the Netherlands may have come to a halt. But 
the debate brought us into the heart of the discussion about the notion of"religjon." 
In most discussions on thjs subject unstunned ritual slaughter is presumed to be 
a "religious" prescript. With "presumed" I mean that many commentators do not 
contest the "religious nature" of this practice. So it is often taken for granted that 
the first hurdle (paragraph l of Article 9 ECHR and paragraph 3 of Article 18 
ICCPR) for the acceptance of this religious freedom is lightly taken. What the 
discussion is focused on subsequently, is on the question whether there are good 
reasons to limit this religious practice (on the basis of paragraph 2 of Article 9 
ECHR; Haupt 2007). 
That common way of framing the dilemma is unfottunate to my mind. The 
thesis that I want to develop in this chapter is that there are good reasons to contest 
the recognition of unstunned ritual slaughter as being "rei igious" at all. We should 
at least consider, for example, whether it is not rather a "cultttral" practice. Or 
perhaps it is an "ideological" custom instead of a "religious" one. So according to 
the approach indicated in this chapter the question is not whether those preslUned 
religious practices can be subject to limitations as are "prescribed by the law." Nor is 
it whether those limitations are "necessary in a democratic society," or whether those 
limitations are requjred "in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public 
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." 
No, the more fundamental question is: is it "religious" in the first place? It is the first 
paragraph of Article 9 ECHR we must be concerned with, not the second. 
This indicates that we seriously have to ponder the question what the word 
"religion" means in the context of human rights declarations. An important 
question in that context is: does trus mean the same thing as the word "religion" 
in ordinary parlance? Or is the legal meaning of the word significantly different? 
And if so, in what sense is the legal meaning of religion different from religion in, 
for example, a social sense? 
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One of the most fundamental insigl1ts of the theory of interpretation is that 
.ontext matters. If something is accepted as "religion" in the social sense, does 
hat necessitate us to accept it as "religion" is the legal sense? (Fuller 1958). And 
f there is a difference, where does that difference lie? Is it possible, for example, 
o sketch the contours of a workable definition of "religion" tn the legal sense?· 
As will be made clear in the course of my argument, this is an important 
~uestion that has a much wider significance than the discussion of ritual slaughter. 
Whether we like it or not (and some people do not seem to like it) we stmply 
must confront the most fundamental question : what is religion? Once this question 
is answered it will be clear that the answer is relevant not only for the matter 
of unstunned ritual slaughter but for many other controversial cases where the 
interpretation of religion is crucial. 
What Does "Religious" Mean? 
Now prima facie this focus on the meaning of the word "religion" may not seem 
a very promising and relevant angle to approach the matter of ritual slaughter. Is 
it not roughly clear what we mean by "religion"? And dtuals, not only around 
slaughtering animals but other occurrences (think of male circumcision, for 
instance) as well, seem indubitably patt of"religion," do they not? Yet, if one goes 
a little deeper into the matter of"religion" it appears a much more elusive concept 
than some of the other phenomena mentioned in the Emopean Convention on 
Human Rights. One of the claims of this chapter is that although it is difficult to 
say where the limits of "free expression" (A1ticle I 0 ECHR) should lie, there is 
not a protracted debate about what counts as the expression of an idea or the airing 
of an opinion. And although one may differ about the boundaries of the "freedom 
of assembly" (A11icle 11 ECHR), there is no heated debate about the question 
whether a gathering of people is really an "assembly." 
Strange though this may seem, this is different when it comes to "religion." 
There is a widespread dissensus about what ideas should be considered "religious" 
and which of those seemingly "religious" ideas should really be categorized as 
"political," "cultural," "ideological" or simply "mad." "Religion'' is an-with 
apologies for using this threadbare concept-essentially contested concept in 
the sense that "speech" and "assembly" are not (Clack 2008; Yandelll999; Hick 
2004; Alston 1967). We should face this openly. 
The "Religiosity" of Unstunned Ritua!l Slaughter 
This is also pertinent to the matter of ritual slaughter. Are the rules around ritual 
slaughter really "religious" rules? Or are they merely "cultural" and ideological"? 
Pablo Lerner and Alfredo Mordechai Rabello in their elaborate and highly 
relevant treatment of stances on ritual slaughter refer to afatwa accepting stunning 
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(Lerner and Rabello 2006/7). The Mufti of Dehli stated in afatwa in 1935 that 
stunning would not violate any religious prescript because stunning does not 
kill the animal (which would clearly contradict t11e Islamic prescriptions around 
slaughter), but only "stuns" the animal. The meiliod indicated is referred to as 
"reversible electric stunning" which means that the animal can recover, and so is 
not dead. The Mufti stated that it is permissible to stun the animal as long as the 
animal does not die in the process of stunning. 
A second authoritative Islamic declaration regarding ritual slaughter is that of 
the Rector of the Al-Azhar University of Cairo from 1982. Stunn ing would not 
I 
make the practice unislamic. And on the Jewish sources Norman Solomon (b. 
1933) writes: "Not all Jews are equally strict in their observance of kashrut (what 
is or is not kosher). Some Reformers reject the system entirely, stressing that the 
essence of Judaism is ethics, not diet ... " (Solomon 2000: 90). 
These stances are, as one may expect, contested by other sources. And then the 
question comes up: which interpretation of religion is right? But that is a difficult 
question to answer, of course, and so most interpreters try to circumvent that tricky 
matter. That also holds true for Lemer and Mordechai Rabello. They write: 
Any framework for the protection of religious beliefs and practices should not 
be sought in the "correct" interpretation of the religious text, especially when 
there is controversy. Theological arguments trying to adopt a narrow or broad 
interpretation afford no real solution to this problem; the concern of this Article 
is rather to explain why a ban on this practice (i.e. unstunned ritual slaughter; 
PC) may be seen by Muslims or Jews as being at odds with their faith. (Lemer 
and Rabello 2006/7: 12) 
ft is this approach l want to challenge jn this chapter. Of course Lerner and 
Mordechai Rabello are right that a ban on the practice of unstuoned ritual 
slaughter "may be seen by Muslims or Jews as being at odds with their faith," 
but this cannot be decisive (Lerner 2006/7: 12). Experience teaches us that a ban 
on the practice of unstunned ritual slaughter is seen by other Muslims and Jews 
as perfectly in harmony with their faith. The approach by Lerner and Mordechai 
Rabello taking what by some Muslims or Jews is at odds with their faith would 
result in a kind of /aissez faire approach towards religious practices. There will 
always be religious believers who proclaim some practices as required or inspired 
by their religion. Especially in a world of religious diversity there are myriads of 
religious beliefs and practices and simply all legal duties would be floating into 
ilie air once we would make compliance with the law dependent on the question 
whether this would not contradict some interpretation of some religion by some 
religious interpreter. 
This is especially relevant, as I will try to show in ilie development of my 
argument, when great new moral principles are at stake, for example ilie principle 
to minimize harm and suffering not only for human animals but also for non-
human animals. Simply accepting everything as "religion" that some people or 
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some religious leaders present as "religious," although seemingly sympathetic (and 
according to some based on "respect" for religion or religious believers), wou ld 
undermine not only the idea of fidelity to the law (Fuller 1958), but also the whole 
idea of freedom of religion. If rei igious freedom is to mean anything ut all there must 
be a dividing line between what can be accepted as "religious" and what not. 
Yet lam perfectly aware that the road ahead of us, not only practically but also 
from a theoretical point of view, is full of hurdles. What criterion should one use 
to accept some idea or practice as "religious"? This is no easy question to answer. 
One of the criteria one could adopt is: numhers count. Jn other words: we need 
a majority or substantial minority of believers who subscribe to a ce11ain practice. 
But then the question iorces itself upon us: why is this relevant? Why could for 
example a small minority not be right? This is something we can ascertain in other 
areas of life as well. Take science. I r it were true that numbers count, the views of 
Darwin, Newton, Galileo or Einstein could never have prevailed. Would not the 
same be true in religion? If"might is right" would be the only criterion in religion, 
the Catholic Church would have been right and not Luthcr. But apparently even 
a minority can present something that can become a majority opinion. Taking the 
perspective that only numbers count would mean that fi·om a legal perspective the 
Reformation is not acknowledged as a religious movement as long as it has not 
established itself. 
So numbers cannot be decisive. But what can? 
!slam-scholar Hans Jansen (b. 1942) writes: "Freedom of religion is no license 
for cannibalism or headhunting. Or (suicide)tcrrorism. Or any form of violating 
the freedom of movement of others" (Jansen 20 I I: 198). So if you say it is your 
religious duty to eat your fellow man, this will not be recognized as "religious" by 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. lfyou proclaim that you have 
to wage religious war against the enemies of God, this is not protected "religion." 
1 f we follow Jansen we cannot accept as "re! igion" what violates the freedom of 
movement of others. We must acknowledge that civilization is evolving and blind 
spots offormcr times now seem to stand in broad daylight. Is that not part of what 
we call ''Enlightenment"? Perhaps Franccs Raday is right and nol only are human 
rights a "product" of the shift "f'i·om a religious to secular state culture at the time 
of the Enlightenment," but also, the Enlightenment is still the background culture 
against which we have to understand human rights (Raday 2003: 663). 
A Debate in the Dutch Senate 
That brings us to a contem'porary disc~1ssjon around the interpretation of religion 
and freedom of religion: the matter of unstunncd ri tual slaughter. With regard to the 
suffering of non-human animals there clearly is an evolution of ideas that cannot 
escape us. The only thing we have to discover now is what consequences to draw 
from these new insights. That is what the discussion is about. And here we have on 
the one hand authors like Singer advocating a new morality (Singer 2011), taking 
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also the Jives of non-human animals into consideration, and on the other hand the 
traditionalists like Oderberg (2000a, 2000b) who think that reference to the way 
freedom of religion was traditionally understood is of overriding importance. 
On December 13, 201 J, in the Senate of the Netherlands there was a debate 
on unstunned animal slaughter (Eerste Kamer, Bedwelming bij ritueel slachten, 
3 157 1, December 13, 2011 ). There had already been a discussion in Parliament 
going on in Dutch society since the summer of 2011 when a legislative proposal 
was launched by The Party for the Animals (Tweede Kamer, Lower House of 
Parliament, 2009-10,31 571, nr. 2). This topic gained international attention. BBC 
News Europe reported: "Dutch MHs effectively ban ritual slaughter of animals. 
And the religious sensitivity was spelled out with the words: 
The Dutch lower house of parliament has passed a law effectively banning the 
ritual slaughter of animals, in a move condemned by Muslim and Jewish groups. 
The legislation states that all animals must be stunned before being killed. But 
the Islamic dhabiha and Jewish shechita methods of ritual slaughter require 
them to be fully conscious. (BBC News 2011) 
The Party for the Animals (a political party founded in 2002 having two seats in 
Dutch Parliament) suggested prohibiting the practice ofunstunned ritual slaughter 
in this country. Under the new law, pre-slaughtcr stunning of animals would 
become obligatory for all forms of slaughter. 
On June 28,2011 in the lower house of the Dutch Parliament an overwhelming 
majority of 116 against 30 votes opted in favor of the bill. But only a few months 
later, on December 14, 2011 the Dutch Senate decided to freeze its vote against the 
ban on unstunned ritual slaughter. This was done after Jewish and Muslim groups 
had campaigned, saying that there is no evidence animals suffer more from ritual 
slaughter than in ordinary abattoirs. Moreover, and this is what concerns us here, 
they claimed that a prescription of stunning before slaughter would compromise 
the freedom of religion. For the moment, the discussion in the Netherlands may 
have come to a halt. 
Yet the question is: will this be the final word? One may doubt that. Tt seems 
the die has been cast. It is very likely this discussion will be reopened, not only 
in the Netherlands, but also in other countries where animal welfare is a cause for 
increasing concern of the public. Here I will focus on the latest discussion on this 
matter, that is, the discussion in the Senate. 
It was interesting to see all those accomplished legal scholars, struggling with 
moral questions that, somehow, their legal training had not quite prepared them for. 
On the basis of the development around animal rights it seems not unreasonable 
to speak of a new moral principle to heed the interests of non-human animals 
(Rachels 199! Regan 1983; Salt 2012). It cannot be the case that this moral 
development has no repercussions for the way we interpret "religion." We 
now interpret (and must interpret) "religion" in the light of fundamental moral 
principles (although we sti ll have to inquire into the nature of those principles). 
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Article 13 of the Treaty of Lisbon (signed by the EU member states on December 
13, 2007, and entered into force on December I , 2009) states that animals are 
"sentient beings." This is the vindication of an insight formulated by John Stua1t 
Mill ( 1806-73) in Utilitarianism ( 1863) that "the whole sentient creation" 
deserves our attention from a moral point of view (Mill 1992: 123). That does not 
make non-human animals completely equal to human animals. It does not annul 
"freedom of religion" completely as alarmist voices want us to believe, nor does 
it make freedom of religion totally subservient to animal welfare. And finally it 
does not place the interests of animals above the interests of humans. These are 
all common misinterpretations of the situation we have to deal with. lt does no 
more than state that the concept of"religion" in the legal sense cannot stay fixed. 
"Present day religion" is something different from religion in medieval times. The 
judiciary and the legislature simply cannot ignore that (Cliteur 2009). 
But having said that, we still have no clear-cut criteria to decide how to 
interpret religion in a present day context. Can we say more than that religion has 
to be "morally acceptable"? That it may not violate "the freedom of movement 
of others" (Jansen 2011: 198)? That people may not use "the Bible for harm" 
(Friedman and Dolansky: xii)? And if they do, this is "misuse"? 
In my view we can. We can be more specific and we must be more specific. [t 
is possible and necessary to articulate some principles that may serve as guidelines 
in the interpretation of present day religion. 
In what follows I will try to present some guidelines for this interpretation of 
the concept of "religion" in a legal context. 
First Principle: No Cruelty or Violence 
To identify principles that may guide us with regard to what can be acknowledged 
as "religion" it may be helpful to reflect on some of the examples considered 
ve1y "religious" and pious in ancient times and nowadays usually rejected as 
"caricatures," "perversions" or "misuse" of religion ("religion hijacked" for 
political purposes). 
Prominent examples seen as manifestations of religious piety in ancient times 
but nowadays rejected in horror are Abraham being prepared to offer his son 
(Delaney 1998; Kretzmann 2001; Cliteur 2010), the burning of witches (Lehmann 
1988) and the military expeditions (crusades) stimulated by the pope in Rome 
(Phillips 2009). We know that those activities were experienced by contemporaries 
as undoubtedly "religious" although many of us cannot see them that way in our 
own time. If that is the case it may be heipful to raise the question: why can we not 
see these practices as religious anymore? A provisional answer to that question is: 
because we consider these practices as immoral. That is undoubtedly true, but at 
the same time it may be enlightening to throw up the question why these acts are 
nowadays considered to be immoral (although highly pious in previous epochs)? 
Answering this question cannot be too difficult. In all three examples we recognize 
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a common thread: violence. Why do we not accept the sacrifice of children, the 
waging of war in the name of God and the burning of witches? What is wrong 
with these things? Is not, at least partly, what we find revolting in these practices 
that there is a clear tendency to violence and cruelty? Could we not formulate the 
essence of modem civilized values as the attempt to gradually diminish violence 
and cruelty from this world? 
This is not to endorse a Whig view of the history of the West or the adoption 
of.a historical determinism a1mex belief in " linear progress." What it is, is to state 
the obvious: that man must crea~e a world that is a better place for everyone, also 
for non-human animals. That ambition of the Enlightenment as implemented in 
t11e nineteenth centw-y in works such as Lecky's History of European Morals from 
Augustus to Charlemagne (1869) and his History of the Rise and Influence of 
Rationalism in Europe (1865) is still on the agenda. As J.B. Bury demonstrates in 
his The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth ( 1920) working 
for progress is not a shallow or naive ideal. Peter Singer's The Expanding Circle 
( 1981 ), One World: The Ethics of Globalization (2002), and Animal Liberation 
(1975), are in that tradition. 
According to the psychologist Steven Pinker (b. 1954) in his book The Beller 
Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined (20 11) there is moraJ progress 
in the sense that our times are less violent than foregoing ages (whjch presupposes, 
of course, that suffering is a great evil, Pinker 20 11 ). There are many examples of 
practices that have died out in the cultural evolution of mankind and which have 
to do with violence. Think of public executions. Everyone who has read some 
literature of seventeenth-, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century authors knows about 
the sometimes vivid descriptions of public executions in Europe. On October 13, 
1660 Samuel Pepys ( 1633-1703) noted in his Diaty:· "I went out to Charing Cross, 
to see Major General Harrison hanged, drawn and quattered - which was done there 
- he looking as cheerfully as any man could in that condition" (Rivlin 2002: 213). 
Second Principle: No Harm to Ot hers 
But there is more. lf we compare some of the manifestations professed to be 
"religious" by some believers and denied that status by others, there seems to be 
the problem that some people decide about other people's fate. The hann being 
perpetrated is not "harm to self," but "ham1 to others" (Feinberg 1987, 1989). 
When Deuteronomy 13:6-11 instructs us to stone to death our own "brother," 
"daughter" or "wife" if they engage in illicit religious ceremonies t11is sounds very 
"universal," as if every single member of the community has the same chance to 
fall victim to these prescripts. But tlle social reality is different. It is the weaker 
members of the community that are being sacrificed to whip the whole community 
into submission to a few strong alpha males: the "community leaders" (Benson 
and Stangroom 2009; Mernissi 1992; Manji 201 1; Cliteur 2011). 
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lt may be illuminating also to refer to the discussion about anesthetics and 
inoculation. Clergymen (and medical men inspired by the clergy) once regarded 
vaccination of humans as, Bertrand Russell ( 1872- 1970) relates, "bidding defiance 
to Heaven itself, even to the wi ll of God" (Russell I 935: I 04). In 1885, when there 
was a severe outbreak of smallpox in Montreal, the Catholic part oft he population 
resisted vaccination. As one priest said: "lf we are afflicted with smallpox, it is 
because we had a carnival last winter, feasting the flesh, which has offended the 
Lord" (ibid.). Natural disasters as a punishment of God for the sins of mankind is 
one of tbe most common arguments to make sense out of the manifest cruelty of 
nature. How to reconcile this with the idea of an omnipotent and benevolent deity? 
Another discussion arose after the discovery of anesthetics. When James Young 
Simpson {1811- 1870) in 1847 recommended their use in childbirth, the clergy 
reminded him that God said to Eve: "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children" 
(Genesis 3:16). Russell comments: "And how could she sorrow if she was under 
the influence of chloroform?" (ibid.). 
A discussion ensued because Simpson met his adversaries with new theological 
arguments. He advanced that there was no harm in giving anesthetics to men 
because God had put Adam in a deep sleep when he extracted Eve from the rib of 
man. According to the ecclesiastics this only saved men and not women - so the 
ban on the use of anesthetics in childbirth should remain intact. 
Why does this discussion strike us as absurd and unsympathetic? As a first 
step to answer that question let us now suppose someone would decide for himself 
not to have himself inoculated against a deadly disease because he puts his trust 
in God. Should the state allow this to happen? In that situation there is no "harm 
to others," but "harm to self." Here, as joJm Stuart Mill famously stated in his 
On Liberty (1859), there are strong reasons for the state not to interfere. In tbis 
case individual autonomy should be our loadstar. Whoever freely chooses not to 
take measures against his own suffering is free to do so. Harm to self should be 
allowed. At least in the case of persons fully conscious of that they decide. But 
the example of anestbetics during childbirth is not of that category. Here men 
decide for women that anesthetics is against the word (and therefore will) of God. 
And here we may say: let women decide for themselves. Or even better: let every 
individual decide for him/herself. 
Third Principle: Equality 
That brings me to a third principle that may be helpful in deciding what practices 
can be accepted as "religious." To gauge the significance of that third principle an 
example may be helpful. On December 5, 1955 Ma1tin Luther King, Jr. ( 1929-
1968) delivered his famous speech to the Montgomery Improvement Association 
about Rosa Parks ( 1913- 2005), the woman who refused to give up her place in the 
bus on behalf of a white person (King 2006). King was an impressive speaker. In 
his characteristic style he castigates the authorities who arrested and carried to jail 
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"one of the finest citizens in Montgomery" because "she refused to get up to give 
her seat to a white person" (King 2006: 516). This protest cannot be wrong, King 
says. And then he presents an interesting argument: 
If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong, 
the Constitution of the United States is wrong. If we arc wrong, God Almighty 
is wrong. If we are wrong, Jesus ofNazareth was merely a utopian dreamer that 
never came down to earth. (King 2006: 518) 
Martin Luther King may have b~en a great orator. But that does not eo ipso mean 
he was a clear thinker. Suppose some male chauvinists or misogynists would 
challenge Martin Luther King and say: " How can you be so sure that God is on the 
side of Rosa Parks? Did not God create man and women? And did he not in His 
Book several times proclaim that man is the master of the household or- which 
comes to the same thing - a man the master of his woman?" 
The male chauvinists could back up their ideas by references to God's Word, in 
particular some expressions by St. Pau l. In I Timothy 2 Paul admonishes women 
to "dress themselves modestly and decently in suitable clothing." They should not 
have their hair braided. "Let a woman learn in silence with full submission," St. 
Paul says and continues: 
l permit no woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she is to keep 
silent. For Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a 
transgressor. Yet she will be saved through childbearing, provided they continue 
in faith and love and holiness, with modesty. (I Timothy 2: 12- 15) 
Martin Luther King seems to think that on the basis of the foregoing he can enlist 
the following institutions and persons for his feminist and anti-racist cause: 
I. The Constitution of the United States; 
2. God Almighty; 
3. Jesus ofNazareth. 
He supposes these all agree about the matter before us, but that is a dubious 
statement, to say the least. The Constitution of the United States has different ideas 
on equality than God Almighty or Jesus Christ. That is to say: the Constitution of 
the United States is firmly based on the principle of equality. The Bible (God and 
Jesus Christ) is not. 
Fourth Principle: Religion Subjected to Reasonableness 
So far we have seen that with regard to the interpretation of the concept of religion 
as it appears in Article 9 ECHR there are at least three principles that may serve as 
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guiding rdeas. To acknowledge "religion" in a human rights context, this "religion" 
may not: 
l. be violent or cruel; 
2. harm others; 
3. infringe equal concern of interests. 
The fourth principle l want to discuss is perhaps the most far-reaching. The question 
we must address is whether under the present circumstances we may demand from 
believers claiming the freedom of religion, that their claims are understandable to 
a nonreligious or differently religious audience. It is the four principles together 
that may serve as a "canon of interpretation" for the interpretation of "religion" 
when we come across that word in human rights declarations and constitutions. 
These four principles are constitutive for the legal (or normative) concept of 
"religion" in contradistinction to the social (or descriptive) concept of religion. 
Unconsciously and without any methodological basis, authors like Karen 
Armstrong and Tony Blair followed that canon of interpretation in their discussions 
with the New Atheists. Their only mistake was that they thought they presented a 
description of an existing reality while what they did was tell us what they think 
is acceptable. 
Secularism and Animal Welfare 
Now let us go back to the discussion on unstunned ritual slaughter in the Dutch 
Senate. During the debate there were some relatively new political parties 
that presented fresh and interesting ideas about the controversy of unstunncd 
ritual slaughter. One of those parties was the Independent Senate Fraction 
(Onafuankelijke Senaats Fractie). Its representative, Professor De Lange, an 
emeritus professor in chemistry from the Free University in Amsterdam, proffered 
a principle that has rarely been stated so clearly in the Dutch legislative assembly 
before. Professor De Lange explained that the considerations of his party with 
regard to the matter of unstunned ritual slaughter were animated by a principle 
that he identified as the "laYcite" or "seculari sm" (Wei l 2009; Chirac 2004; Fourest 
and Venner 2003; Kintzlcr 2007; Cliteur 20 12; Blackford 2012). His party, so De 
Lange said, operated on the basis of a "strict secular" foundation (Eerste Kamer 
2011 - 12: 39). And. by this he meant: Chutch and state have to be separated. His 
party respected the constitutionally protected freedom ·of religion of others, but 
nevertheless he stated that arguments that are derived from religion in the societal 
debate should not play a preponderant role. He also proclaimed that religion 
should have a "private" character. 
Furthermore De Lange commented on vegetarianism. This, he said, could not 
be enforced by the state nor should it be. But that the slaughter of animals should be 
perforn1ed with a minimum of stress and anger for the animals involved would be 
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a pertinent moral obligation. Unstunned ritual slaughter dated from a period when 
mankind had _no means at its disposal to alleviate the suffering of animals. Now 
mankind has. And therefore mankind is morally obliged to use these methods (that 
is, stunning). Arguments based on "revelations of a supernatural being" that are by 
definition impossible to verify, are insufficient to annul that moral obligation. lt is 
for that reason that his faction would not consider those religious arguments valid. 
On the basis of these considerations De Lange voted in favo r of the proposal to 
eliminate the religious exception to stun animals bpfore slaughter. 
His intervention did not solicit 'any comments from his colleagues in the 
political assembly. This is unfortunate, because his specific angle of approaching 
the problem of ritual slaughter was fresh and potentially far-reaching. 
Is this Interpretation of Secularism not too Strict? 
But perhaps his statements were too bold to be accepted in the fonn he stated them. 
Does, for example, the principle of the secular state (Biackford 20 12) entail that 
religious arguments are no longer admissible in politics? Would not that go too 
far? Nevertheless, De Lange is right when he says that a serious disadvantage of 
religious arguments (that is, arguments that are purely religious and do not make 
an apologetic that is independently persuasive) is that they will not convince an 
auditorium that is composed of Usteners with a diverse religious and nonreligious 
background. So in political assemblies in pluralist societies (as most societies are 
nowadays, especially in the Western world) those arguments are little more than 
an oratio pro. domo. 
In my view the principle of"la!cite" should not be interpreted in U1e sense that 
religious believers are not allowed to present religious arguments in the public 
sphere. They have "petmission to speak," so to say. Yet, there is a more restrictive 
interpretation of the principle of secularism that may be more appropriate 
in this context. This more restrictive interpretation can hardly be considered 
as too demanding or put too many constraints on religious believers. lt is this 
more limited interpretation of secularism that seems pertinent here. This limited 
interpretation means that when the judiciary has to ascertain what is the legal 
meaning of "religion" in the context of present day human rights declarations 
and constitutional provisions in r.nodem constitutions, this concept of "religion" 
has to meet certain standards of reasonableness that at least have a potential to 
convince us all. Here referring to a private "revelation" is simply not enough. As 
Thomas Painc (1737- 1809) famously explained: if something has been revealed 
to a certain person, and not revealed to any other person, it is "revelation to that 
person only" {Paine 1995: 668). The religious believer, claiming that his "religious 
revelations" should enjoy constitutional protection while it violates basic moral 
principles of a civilized society must make clear that his religion deserves that 
protection. ft should not be revelation "to that person only" or "that group only." 
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The Burden of Proof 
A consequence of the requirement stated above is that a religious believer who 
claims a privilege on the basis of a human right must be able to give some reasons 
why the values that he claims deserve a special status should indeed be worthy of 
that status. 
Formulating such a requirement is certain ly a break with a long established 
tradition that religious believers cannot be required to state the reasons for their 
religious belief. There is a widely shared understanding that demanding from 
believers to explain why they bold certain things "holy," interferes in an UJJdue 
fashion witJ1 their religious freedom. But if we follow Professor De Lange's 
approach in the mitigated form as expounded above, I think we may safely require 
from someone who claims a privileged status for a "religious belief' (and on that 
basis exemption from the ordinary legal duties that all citizens have to conform 
to) that at least he provides some reasons why that belief should be classified as 
"religious" at all. 
During the debate in the Dutch Senate this demand was voiced most 
categorically by the representative of another relatively new political party: Faber 
van de Klashorst oftbe Party for Freedom. Faber made clear that she comes from 
a butcher's fami ly and accordingly knows what she is talking about. She soberly 
noticed that everyone with sound moral sense can understand that the ritual 
slaughtering of a healthy animal that js fully conscious of what is happening is 
not a very happy affair (Eerste Kamer 2011 - 12: 26). The animals have to be put 
on their backside which is an unnatural position for the animal. Instinctively the 
animal fee ls what is going to happen and it experiences fear, anger and pain. On 
average three to five cuts of the carotid artery are necessary before the animal loses 
consciousness and dies. lt can last between half a minute and five minutes before 
the animal is really dead. Some of the animals with their neck only half cut try to 
stand up. "This is an awful sight. This should not happen in a Dutch slaughterhouse 
in 201 l" (ibid.). And just as Professor De Lange did, she underscores that the 
religious prescripts about unstunned ritual slaughter dated from 3,000 to 1,400 
years ago. Can we really claim that "best practices" of those times are still the 
best we can come up with in our times? Jfwe do not accept polygamy, the stoning 
of adulterous women and the killing of homosexuals as legitimate expressions of 
religious feeling, why do we do this with unstunned ritual slaughter? 
These were all pertinent questions, but her most intriguing remark was in 
reaction to a colleague in the Senale who spoke for a small Christian party, called 
the "Union of Christians" (in Dutch: "ChristenUnie"). The representative of the 
Christian party, Mr. Ester, contended that prohibiting unstunned ritual slaughter 
would put the freedom of religion under pressure (if not worse). On that occasion 
Faber interjected that she would like to hear why unstunned ritual slaughter was 
considered to be a religious prescript ( ibid.: 30). Where was this wri tten? Could 
her colleague show chapter and verse? 
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As r have made clear during the course of my argument I consider this to be 
a perfectly reasonable question. If someone demands to be exempted from the 
obligations of the law (applicable to ala citizens a like, one may presume) the least 
one may expect is that this person is able and prepared to explain why he or she 
should enjoy a privileged status. Only referring to "freedom of religion" without 
being able or prepared to explain why this has something to do with religion is 
unreasonable and cannot be accepted in a liberal democratic regime. But the 
representative from the Christian,party reacted as if great injustice would be done 
to believers if this were standard practice. He called this a "dangerous" demand, 
because it was not "for them," the members of the Dutch Senate, to judge what is 
a religious prescript and what is not. Decisions about what is a religious prescript 
and what not, should be left to the religious community. 
As r already indicated in the beginning of this chapter this is a weak argument 
because the religious community is divided on the issue. Traditionally religious 
communities had internally identified the normative source of authority. But the 
problem in a pluralist society is that those sources are in disarray. Who to listen 
to? To the most conservative elements in the community? Or to the progressive 
factions? Faber did not accept Ester's answer, and rightly so. She indicated that 
it was at least a legitimate question whether there was a scriptural basis for the 
practice to kill the animal while fully conscious. And then she came with the 
punch line: "but you cannot show me this, because it is not written anywhere" 
(ibid.: 30). And Faber was right. There is no prohibition of stunning in the Torah. 
And therefore the claim that unstunned ritual slaughter is a " religious practice" 
is based on the fact that some people claim that this is a religious practice. But 
because there are also people who claim this practice is not religious, the judge bas 
to decide whose arguments should prevail. 
At that moment we are back at the beginning of our argument. Once we 
concede we can argue about what is religious and what is not, both parties have to 
provide arguments. 
Here we see that pluralism has changed the world we live in. Religious 
communities do not operate as homogeneous entities in a pluralist world but are 
themselves pluralistic. It is difficult, if not impossible, to provide examples oJ 
religious prescripts that are universally shared within the religious community. 
and the necessity of unstunned ritual slaughter is certainly a case in point. 
Although orthodox believers pretend that there are clear-cut religious prescriptiom 
representative for the religious creed of the group as a whole, this pretense is ofter 
mere nostaJgia. So whenever someone has the pretense to speak for the group as ~ 
whole some skepticism is warranted. 
A Common Objection: A "Dangerous" Idea 
Now senator Ester and many other people fee l uncomfortable with this situatior 
because they have the feeling that respect for religion also comprises respect forth< 
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way people identify their religion. Let me return to the famous definition of religion 
by William lames ( 1842- 191 0): "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual 
men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to 
whatever they may consider the divine, (Jarnes 1982: 31). James proclaims the 
religiousness of a practice is dependent on whether people "apprehend thems~lves 
to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." This leaves broad 
latitude to the individual believer to determine what he considers "divine." 
This individualist approach is usually argued for as something that is 
required by "respect for religion" and also, even more mistaken, as respect for 
"the individual believer." The approach advocated by Faber, so it is often said, 
undermines the freedom of religion. Tt makes the religious freedom completely 
dependent on the interpretation of that freedom by outsiders, some critics contend, 
and this certainly animated senator Ester's reaction to senator Faber's demand to 
cite chapter and verse. Religion is put under the tutelage of morals and therewith 
basically destroyed. Is this not a "dangerous" idea, to quote Ester again? 
That may be doubted. My claim is that in the end the approach by Faber is 
more respectful of religion than the approach by Ester. Let me summarize. We 
have, basically, two approaches to the concept of religion: 
1. Approach Faber: some religious practices are so immoral they cannot 
be accepted as religious (and accordingly protected by the freedom of 
religion). 
2. Approach Ester: what is religious and what is not, is subjected to the 
conviction of the individual believer. 
The approach of Ester ultimately makes religjon dependent on the highly 
indiyidualist interpretations of sometimes quite idiosyncratic "believers" (like 
James argued for). It is common to view his approach as respectful to religion. 
But is it really? It is certainly true that the approach by Faber limits religion in the 
sense that it excludes some religious practices, but is that really disrespectful? Is 
it not, on the contrary, more respectful to religion because in tbe long run it saves 
religion fi·om deteriorating into quite bizarre religious practices sanctioned by the 
most reactionary forces within the religious communities? 
Again this can best be exemplified by means of an example: the official 
recognition of a new church and a new religion in Sweden. Recently in Sweden 
a new church was recognized by the Swedish government, namely the church 
whose central tenet is the right to file-share (BBC New~ 20 12a). Arguably, this 
example shows that the approach to religion as advocated by Ester is a dead end. 
Missionary Church of Kopirnism 
The "Missionary Church of Kopimism" (in Swedish Missionerande 
Kopimistsamfundet) claims that the act of sharing information through copying 
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is akin, if not identical, to a religious service. The kopimists (called Kopimis{s 
from copy me) consider CTRL+C and CTRL+V (shortcuts for copy and paste) as 
sacred symbols. A kopimist has as the core of his professed religious belief that all 
information should be freely distributed unrestricted. The kopim ists are opposed 
to the privatization of knowledge in all its forms . As they say: " in our belief, 
communication is sacred." This is not because they want to promote illegal file-
sharing, but because this means the open distribution of knowledge for all. The 
church also has a spiritual leader who, elated by the recent success of his religious 
movement, speaks of a " large step." The church was founded by a 19-year-old 
philosophy student lsak Gerson who seriously hopes that now file-sharing will be 
given religious protection. In a statement he says: 
For tJ1e Church of Kopimism, information is holy and copying is a sacrament. 
lnfom1ation holds a value, in itself and in what it contains and the value 
multiplies through copying. Therefore copying is central for the organization 
and its members. (BBC News 20 12a) 
Not everyone reacted enthusiastically, but that cannot impress the members 
of the new religious movement, because the Swedish government agency 
Kammerkollegiet finally registered the Church of Kopimism as a religious 
organization after three previous applications had fai led. 
Now the question is: what is the greatest disaster that may happen to religious 
freedom as protected in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights? 
Is the greatest threat to freedom of religion that the legislature and the judiciary 
put limits to what can count as serious religion? Or is the greatest threat to religion 
that the religious community can compfetely determine by itself what is religious 
and what is not? The example of the Kopimists, in spite of the fact that they do not 
advocating harming anybody, may still serve as an intimidating example of what 
can happen with religious freedom. 
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